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he proposal to move to a full banking union in the eurozone presents the EU with a 
radical shift in regime. Whereas until today the home country rule had prevailed, the 
European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  will  now  become  the  supervisor  of  the  eurozone. 
Precisely how this is implemented will need to be closely monitored. Since it is such a radical 
change, there is a risk that the decision will not be taken to its fullest extent and that member 
states will continue to maintain some control. 
The concept of a banking union entered the EU debate fairly unexpectedly. There is still 
some discussion as to who coined the term, which in itself is unclear and certainly confusing 
for European citizens. If the eurozone now wants to form a ‘banking union’, what were the 
single market programme, the financial services action programme and the G-20 agenda all 
about? Why does the EU still have so many backdoors to a real single market, 20 years after 
its accomplishment? What makes the eurozone so different from the rest of the Union that it 
needs a banking union? And how will this work alongside the single banking market? 
The challenging tasks facing authorities in the EU, in particular in the eurozone, include i) 
properly defining the term  ‘banking union’, ii) detailing the role of the ECB and allocating 
the respective powers and cooperation between federal and local banking authorities in a 
banking union and  iii) adapt EU legislation accordingly. The test for a banking union will be 
whether it manages to stop the increasing the ‘home bias’ and financial market disintegration 
within the eurozone, which also hinders the efficient execution of monetary policy. 
1.  The what and how of a eurozone banking union 
A  banking  union  can  be  defined  as  a  fully  integrated  bank  regulatory  and  supervisory 
system within a federal structure. Supervision is de-nationalised, in that its form becomes 
exactly the same and is neutral with respect to the nationality of the bank. Banking unions 
exist today in other federations, such as in Canada, the US, Australia and even Germany and 
Switzerland.  It  is  worth  recalling  that  in  these  federations  other  elements  of  financial 
supervision, such as the supervision of securities markets and insurance companies, or the 
taxation of firms and financial products, are not necessarily unified. Full federal supervision 
of banks does not mean that lower-level authorities no longer exercise competences, as is 
exemplified in the US.  
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In the EU federal model, a banking union, further to the Eurozone Council decision of June 
28-29, will be formed on the basis of Art. 127(6) of the EU Treaty (TFEU). Hence, supervision 
will move to the European Central Bank only for banks licensed in the eurozone, as that 
article is only applicable to those countries that are part of EMU, not to the countries that 
have a derogation or a special status within the EU. However, the decision will need to be 
taken with the unanimous agreement of all 27 EU member countries’ finance ministers. 
Art. 127.6 (TFEU) reads: 
The  Council,  acting  by  means  of  regulations  in  accordance  with  a  special  legislative 
procedure,  may  unanimously,  and  after  consulting  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial 
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings. 
This article is repeated in Art. 25 of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) Statute. 
An EU banking union, in the form defined above, could also be constituted differently to 
apply to all countries of the EU, but it would undoubtedly have been more difficult to find a 
legal basis and hence an agreement. Art. 65 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) indirectly states that, 
in  discussing  the  freedom  of  capital  movements,  the  prudential  supervision  of  financial 
institutions is a prerogative of the member states. Another possibility, but only within the 
context of EMU, is Art. 136 allowing EMU member states to adopt specific measures for 
budgetary and economic policy coordination, although it is debatable whether this could be 
extended to prudential supervision. Finally, there is also the ‘enhanced cooperation’ route 
(Art. 326 and following). The European Commission itself, while claiming that it originated 
the idea at the informal European Council on 23 May 2012, was in favour of the full EU 
option,  although  it  did  not  specify  which  institutional  changes  a  banking  union  would 
imply. In its memos on the Banking Union, it did not refer to any specific treaty articles.1 
In turning supervision over to the ECB, the eurozone will become the ‘home country’ of 
banks, with the ECB in charge of authorising the banks. This is a dramatic shift from the 
system of supervision that the EU has known so far. It means that, in the ESCB, the ECB will 
be the authority granting a banking licence and exercising day-to-day supervision. It will 
also  allow  eliminate  the  grey  area  in  the  respective  tasks  of  the  ECB  and  the  eurozone 
National Central Banks (NCBs), especially with regard to financial stability, the Lender of 
Last Resort (LOLR) function and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). 
The official reason for moving supervision to the ECB is to do away with the country-risk 
premium, and in so doing, “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”, as the 
June Euro Area Summit  stated. During the sovereign debt crisis, banks’ wholesale funding 
costs  have  increasingly  become  correlated  with  the  funding  costs  of  their  home  country, 
creating a very unlevel playing field. However, it may also have been a condition set by the 
ECB to enable it to continue its liquidity-providing operations. Since the start of monetary 
union, the ECB has complained of a lack of information about the national banking systems, 
a complaint that has grown louder as the crisis deepened. Until recently, however, member 
states  managed  to  fend  off  this  criticism  with  the  argument  that  sensitive  information 
regarding  the  competitiveness  of  the  local  banking  system  could  be  leaked  to  foreign 
competitors. The regulation forming the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) states, in Art. 
15, that supervisory information is provided “as a rule in summary or aggregate form such 
that individual financial institutions cannot be identified”. However, with the massive long-
term  refinancing  operations  of  December  2011  and  February  2012,  the  ECB  provided 
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troubled banks such as Bankia, €40 billion, or Dexia with €32.5 billion.2 With supervision 
entirely in national hands, and limited or non-existent information-sharing, it is no wonder 
that the ECB would like to know more about the soundness of the financial institutions to 
whom it is making loans of such magnitude. 
2.  Operational implications for the ECB 
Viewed  in  a  global  and  European  context,  transferring  more  supervisory  powers  to  the 
central bank is nothing new. Most central banks in the eurozone are also bank supervisors. In 
response to the crisis, central banks in several jurisdictions have been given more banking 
supervisory powers, in particular in the US and the UK. Overall, it was judged that central 
banks needed to have all the information necessary to respond rapidly to a crisis and that 
closer  cooperation  with  macro-prudential  supervisors  should  increase  the  quality  of 
supervision.  Specifically  in  an  EU  context,  transferring  supervision  to  the  ECB  raises  a 
number of conceptual, legal and operational issues, which will need to be clarified in the 
Council decision. 
Clarify the objective of prudential supervision by ECB 
Unlike  monetary  policy,  prudential  supervision  and  its  objective  are  not  defined  in  the 
Treaty.  It  only  says  that  the  ESCB  can  contribute  to  financial  stability,  and  that  specific 
aspects of the prudential supervision of financial institutions can be transferred to the ECB, 
with the exception of insurance undertakings. As a result of the financial crisis, the ECB was 
already given the responsibility for macro-prudential oversight through the creation of the 
European Systemic Risk Board, an independent body that is staffed by the ECB and is largely 
controlled by the central banks of the EU. Its main tasks are to identify, monitor and act 
against  systemic  risk  of  markets  and  institutions,3  although  it  cannot  adopt  binding 
decisions. 
The ECB mandate will thus have to be clarified in the European Commission’s proposals. It 
will be important to indicate that (micro)-prudential supervision focuses on institutions, with 
the aim of protecting their solvency and viability. It is distinct from other forms of financial 
supervision, which control the behaviour of financial institutions (conduct of business rules), 
financial products or anti-competitive practices (competition rules). 
The nature of prudential supervision in the ECB 
Transferring  prudential  supervision  to  the  ECB  means  that  it  becomes  part  of  an 
independent European institution. Until very recently, the Ecofin Council had insisted that 
financial supervision had to be executed where accountability lies and budgets are available, 
which  meant  at  the  level  of  the member  states,  in  an  organisation  closely  related  to  the 
ministries of finance.4 The European Parliament also wants accountability, and strived hard 
to  have  this  included  in  the  regulations  creating  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities 
(ESAs) (see e.g. Art. 3 in the ESAs’ regulations). The Eurozone Council decision is a radical 
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supervision must be accountable to the Ecofin Council. The Ecofin Council recalled this position in the 
early days of the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, stating that the structure of financial supervision 
should not unbalance the EU institutional structure (see Lannoo, 2008, pp. 18-19 and 22-23). 4 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
departure  from  this,  which  will  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  ECB’s  operational 
structure.  
A  central  bank’s  need  for  independence  in  carrying  out  its  monetary  policy  function  is 
commonly accepted. The success of a central bank in executing its monetary policy can be 
objectively measured by the maintenance of price stability. This is also why the central bank 
should  be  immune  to  short-term  political  considerations  in  fulfilling  its  mandate.  These 
considerations  do  not  apply  in  the  same  way  to  financial  supervision.  While  prudential 
supervision  needs  to  be  exercised  independently,  the  measurement  of  success  in  the 
execution of this function is more difficult, and requires broader accountability. Prudential 
supervision is performed to maintain financial stability and to protect depositors. Taxpayers’ 
money  may  be  needed  to  achieve  this  stability,  which  requires  accountability  before  a 
parliament.  
Exercising  supervision  may  thus  reduce  the  independence  of  the  central  bank,  and  its 
accountability  will  have  to  increase.  Deciding  on  a monetary policy  stance  may  be  done 
rapidly based on a limited set of variables, whereas reviewing the situation in the banking 
markets and of individual banks is much more complex. The pressure upon the ECB will 
grow to explain its position, as will the criticism of its decisions. The ECB could find itself in 
a conflict of interest between its roles as guardian of price stability and guardian of financial 
stability.  The  debate  about  its  stance  vis-à-vis  the  Spanish  banking  sector  is  already  an 
indication of just how difficult the performance of the supervisory responsibility will be for 
the ECB as an independent institution. 
Structural implications for the ECB 
The above considerations regarding the objective and nature of financial supervision should 
be clarified in the operational structure. Today, the ECB’s Governing Council, which meets 
every fortnight, takes the monetary policy decisions, with the six-person Executive Board in 
charge  of  day-to-day  operations.  Adding  prudential  supervision  to  the  ECB’s  tasks  will 
require  changes  in  the  management structure,  such  as  the  creation  of  a  special  standing 
committee within the ECB for supervisory matters, reporting to the Executive Board.  
Much  of  the  day-to-day  work  on  prudential  supervision  will  be  carried  out  by  the 
participating  central  banks,  in  tune  with  the  decentralised  mode  in  which  the  ECB  was 
created: “the ECB shall have recourse to the NCBs, to the extent deemed possible and appropriate, to 
carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the Eurosystem” (Art. 12.1 of the Statute of the 
ESCB). The implementation of this plan will be the most far-reaching for the four eurozone 
countries where supervision does not reside with the central bank: Finland, Luxembourg, 
Malta  and  Cyprus;  and  for  Germany,  where  financial  supervision  is  split  between  the 
Bundesbank (execution) and Bafin (formal responsibility).  
In view of the importance of maintaining a strict separation between monetary policy and 
financial  supervisory  functions,  it  is  strongly  suggested  that  responsibility  for 
communication about these matters be split, with the ECB vice-president placed in charge.  
One  issue  requiring  harmonisation  is  the  contribution  to  the  costs  of supervision,  where 
different systems are in operation in the EU and eurozone. The ECB will also need to possess 
the power to impose sanctions in the case of violations. 
Scope of supervision by the ECB 
The  ECB’s  responsibility  will  apply  to  prudential  matters  of  all  banks  operating  in  the 
eurozone, big or small. After the decision by the Eurozone Council, some commentators 
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whereas the member states’ authorities would remain responsible for smaller banks. Such a 
system is in operation in the US, where the Federal Reserve can charter banks, mostly the 
larger internationally active banks, as well as the states, resulting in a very complex financial 
system, with overlapping and often competing controlling entities, despite various  attempts 
by the rule-makers to streamline the system. The 2010 Dodd-Frank bill stated that the Fed 
should supervise all banks with balance sheets above $50 billion, but did not reduce the role 
of the states.5  
How the eurozone decision will be worked out remains to be seen, but it is important that 
the  same system  will  apply  to  all  banks  in  the  eurozone,  large  or  small,  with  of  course 
differences in supervisory intensity. Larger banks will be under much closer examination 
and inspection than smaller banks, but the system of supervision should be the same. To 
ensure objectivity, supervisory panels should be multinational in composition, even for large 
or mid-sized local banks. But a system of dual supervision as operates in the US should be 
avoided. 
The assignment of micro-prudential supervision will render the task of the ESRB easier and 
give it broader powers. Since the ESRB has no formal power to issue binding directions, it 
was  seen  as  a  lame  duck.  The  addition  of  micro-prudential  responsibilities  to  the  ECB 
radically changes the ESRB’s task.  
3.  Regulatory changes 
The  most  important  short-term  regulatory  change  will  be  the  amendment  of  all  EU 
legislative acts to make the eurosystem the competent authority for eurozone-based banks. 
In the long term, however, the most important questions relate to the impact on the form of 
regulation in the EU and the relationship between the members and non-members of the 
eurozone (the Ins and the Outs). Related to this is the question of the future role of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA).  
As with the coming into force of the ESA regulations, the EU will have to enact an omnibus 
regulation changing all previous acts, stating that the ECB is the licensing authority for all 
banks in the eurozone. Licensing and reporting rules should thus be exactly the same across 
the  eurozone,  but  this  will  have  implications  for  the  broader  EU.  As  for  the  day-to-day 
supervision,  it  will  be  a  huge  task  for  the  ECB  to  harmonise  the  supervisory  methods, 
although the work done by EBA (in COREP and FINREP) so far will certainly be of help. 
In  a  longer-term  perspective,  banking  union  consolidates  the  move  towards  maximum 
harmonisation, for the EU as a whole. Within the eurozone banking union, it is evident that 
exactly the same rules should apply, but as the situation of the other member states is that of 
a derogation of monetary union (with the exception of the UK and Denmark), there is no 
reason  to  adopt  a  different  approach  for  the  Ins  and  the  Outs.  The  recent  call  by  Mark 
Hoban,  the  UK  Finance  Minister,  for  minimum  standards  and  proportionate  regulation, 
while supporting banking union, is thus puzzling.6 
Banking  union  could  thus  make  the  eurozone  more  attractive  as  a  financial  centre.  The 
complex interaction between home- and host-country authorities in the eurozone will no 
longer exist, as will continue to be the case, for example, for the remaining host-country 
supervisory powers for liquidity requirements. Supervisory colleges in the eurozone will be 
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a thing of the past, and supervisors of cross-border banks in the eurozone will sit around the 
table  as  members  of  the  ESCB,  and  no  longer  as  sovereign  supervisors.  The  formal 
responsibility of supervisory decisions will be with one institution, the ECB.  
Within the banking union, capital could be located anywhere, but consolidation raises tricky 
corporate tax and accounting issues, which remain largely non-harmonised. Company law 
and  shareholder  rights  also  remain  non-harmonised  and  could  pose  barriers  to 
consolidation. Will banking through branches and subsidiaries in the eurozone become an 
issue of the past for eurozone-licensed banks? And how will this apply to non-eurozone but 
EU licensed banks? 
Maximum harmonisation will also affect depositor protection and crisis-resolution systems. 
So far, both are the subject of draft directives, which leave much in the hands of the member 
states. The draft depositor guarantee schemes Directive (DGS) sets the level of protection at a 
maximum of €100,000, but does not harmonize the governance structure of the fund (public 
or private), nor does it create a Europe-wide fund, or a network of funds. The draft crisis 
management Directive for the first time harmonises bank resolution triggers and procedures 
and requires member states to appoint a resolution authority and create a resolution fund, 
but it does not put in place a unified resolution structure. With the agreement of the June 
Eurozone Council that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can (in the last instance) be 
used  to  recapitalize  banks,  it  follows  that  resolution  procedures  should  be  fully  aligned 
within the eurozone, and that the ESM will become the ultimate resolution authority.  
Whither the EBA? 
The EBA could continue to play a role in technical and regulatory standard-setting for the 
EU (and the EEA) for the level-2 rules, but this function is expected to diminish over time. 
EBA supervisory functions on the other hand will have limited or no significance under 
Banking Union, as they were designed for an EU-27, not for a Union with an emerging mega-
supervisor. The problem towards effective change will be the European Parliament, which 
worked  hard  on  the  ESA’s  regulations  to  ensure  a  clear  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
authorities to report to the EP. Such accountability will never obtain to the same degree from 
the ECB. 
A  future  role  for  the  EBA  could  be  to  re-orient  it  as  a  conduct  of  business  and  product 
regulator for the EU banking sector. The control of financial activities and products is one of 
the tasks of the EBA (Art. 9) that is not yet very developed, but urgently needed. Product 
regulation does not fall within the ambit of the ECB’s future tasks, and will continue to 
reside under host country rules in the EU, because of consumer protection rules. In this 
sense, the eurozone, and the EU, will be moving more towards a ‘twin peaks’ or objective-
based model of supervision, based on the subsidiarity principle. Only those tasks that can be 
better performed at the ECB level would be centralised. Conduct of business control would 
largely remain at national level, coordinated by the EBA and ESMA. 
The ESA regulations will need to be modified to let the ECB be formally part of the steering 
committee  of  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities.  This  will  allow  the  ECB  to  obtain 
information about securities markets and insurance supervision, but it will raise the problem 
of the balance within the ESA Steering Committee. Will the chairs of the ESA’s sit alongside 
the President or Vice-President of the ECB? 
EU rules will also need to be changed to add the ECB alongside the EBA, or to replace EBA 
with the ECB. Notifications or coordination on the supervisory level will require the clear 
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4.  Broader implications 
The ECB’s position internationally 
A single supervisor for the eurozone should greatly facilitate the supervision of large cross-
border banks and the communication amongst supervisors. This will remove one rung from 
the ladder in the EU, the home country. It will also oblige large eurozone-based banks to 
communicate in a more distant and formal manner with their supervisors.  
The representation of eurozone countries in international supervisory fora such as the Basel 
Committee and the Financial Stability Board should fall to the ECB rather than the individual 
member countries. This issue has also been debated for a long time in the context of the 
eurozone’s  representation  in  the IMF,  without  success  so  far,  but  requires  an  immediate 
change  for  supervisory  matters.  This  would  also  send  an  important  signal  to  the 
international community that banking union will be implemented to its fullest extent.  
The relationship with state aid and competition policy authorities 
As stated in the June Eurozone Council decision, EU state aid rules will be applied in full to 
the recapitalisation of the Spanish banking sector by the ESM. Some of the conditions for 
recapitalisation were already highlighted in the Memorandum of Understanding, which are 
in line with the Commission’s communications on the subject.7 These include: i) aid must be 
limited to the minimum necessary, ii) it must be proportional to the contribution made by 
private share- and bondholders, iii) the aid must be appropriate and well-targeted and iv) 
the aid must be remunerated. These criteria will be applied by the Commission when vetting 
the support for the Spanish savings banks. If large cases in the past can serve as a reference, 
the  conditions  imposed  by  the  EU  authorities  can  be  very  drastic,  as  was  the  case  for 
Commerzbank and ING. Hence it means that i) the business plans of recapitalised banks will 
be analysed in detail, and eventually further restructuring will be imposed, and ii) the aid 
will have to be remunerated, which in the case of aid by the ESM will be paid to the ESM. It 
can be expected that in its decision concerning capital support the ESM will be less generous 
than the member states were in 2008, as the decision has to be taken with the unanimity of  
its members (Art. 5.6 ESM Treaty), all of whom will be anxious to see their money returned.  
State aid to the banking sector, however, raises the question of borders between Lender of 
Last Resort (LOLR) support by the ECB, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) by the NCBs 
and ESM support or outright state aid. Over the last year, the ECB has clearly been acting as 
LOLR  for  important  parts  of  the  eurozone  banking  system  and  replaced  the  interbank 
market. LOLR support is, in the Commission’s understanding, not state aid as it is central 
bank money that is provided on a non-discriminatory basis to the banking sector and based 
on adequate collateral. The same cannot be said of Emergency Liquidity Assistance, which 
can be provided in extreme circumstances by NCBs in the EMU, but would be considered as 
state aid as it is provided in special cases, not necessarily against collateral, and from the 
reserves of the NCBs – not real central bank money. The agreement of the ECB’s Governing 
Council and the Commission is required for ELA. The transfer of supervision to the ECB 
should clarify the role of the ECB as LOLR and do away with the ELA in the eurozone. 
5.  Conclusions 
The move towards banking union is an opportunity for eurozone leaders to show the world 
that they are drawing lessons from the crisis and can streamline their supervisory structures. 
It  is  also  an  opportunity  for  eurozone-based  banks  to  facilitate  their  communication  and 
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reporting to supervisory authorities. For this to be the case, the implications of the decision 
of 27 June will have to be taken to their full significance. This applies both to the regulatory 
changes it necessitates, and to changes to the current supervisory structure and the role of 
EBA.  
By  moving  prudential  supervision  to  the  ECB,  a  more  optimal  system  of  financial 
supervision will emerge in the eurozone towards a ‘three-peaks’ model, with centralised 
control over prudential and competition policy and decentralised conduct of business and 
product  regulation.  It  also  allows  for  the  removal  of  some  inconsistencies  in  the  current 
eurozone financial supervisory framework with regard to the responsibility for lender-of-
last-resort support, emergency liquidity assistance and crisis management. 
Difficulties can be expected with the role of the ECB as an independent central bank with its 
new task in the domain of prudential supervision and its accountability before the European 
Parliament. The same form of accountability as at present for monetary policy is not adapted 
for financial supervision, and will require flexibility from both sides – the policy-makers and 
the ECB – to come up with a credible solution. 
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